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policy	 discourses.	 The	 pursuit	 of	 a	 symmetrical,	 unconstrained	 and	 ultimately	
highly	 repressive	 and	 militarised	 ‘war’	 strategy	 has	 not	 produced	 the	 desired	
results.	Demand	and	supply	have	 shifted	but	not	diminished	over	 the	past	 few	
decades.	Price	has	been	 largely	 falling	and	purity	 rising	on	an	aggregate	global	
level.	 Meanwhile	 the	 militarised	 ‘war’	 has	 fuelled	 incarceration,	 disease	
epidemics,	 human	 rights	 abuses	 and	 a	 contagion	 of	 violence,	 criminality	 and	
repressive	policing	and	military	policies	across	entire	regions.	The	recognition	of	
this	 reality	 has	 fuelled	 a	 tidal	 shift	 in	 global	 discourses,	 ultimately	 leading	 the	
most	affected	countries,	including	Colombia,	Guatemala	and	Mexico	to	call	a	UN	




and	 has	 been	 perceived	 by	many	 as	 a	 failure,	 however	 it	 highlighted	 two	 key	
points.	The	first	is	that	a	new	control	system	or	‘regime’	is	emerging.	Driving	the	
change	 are	 local	 policy	 reforms,	 normative	 shifts,	 international	 legal	
reinterpretation	and	a	more	nuanced	 implementation	of	 the	 international	drug	





Consequently,	 the	 perception	 that	 rewriting	 current	 UN	 conventions	 is	 a	
necessary	prerequisite	for	rolling	back	from	this	global	strategy	is	incorrect.	To	
help	 understand	 the	 changing	 international	 system	 or	 ‘regime’	 this	 chapter	







be)	 a	 reformist	 wish	 list,	 it	 represents	 a	 compromise	 framework	 for	 member	
states	 to	 wade	 through	 an	 incremental	 systemic	 reform	 process.	 This	 reform	
process	 is,	 and	 will	 continue,	 playing	 out	 in	 an	 organic	 and	 ad-hoc	 manner	 –	
representative	 of	 the	 legion	 determinants	 of	 international	 drug	 control.	 This	
chapter	 will	 offer	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 interests,	 trajectories	 and	 schools	 of	
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As	 political	 scientist	 Ethan	 Nadelmann	 wrote	 in	 1991,	 the	 norms	 of	 the	
international	control	‘regime’,	‘evolved	and	exist	not	only	in	the	conventions	and	




from	 the	 intersection	 of	many	 overlapping	 and	 shifting	 factors,	 each	 of	 which	
could	alter	the	shape	of	cooperation.	
	
Further,	 as	 international	 scholar	 Robert	 Keohane	 writes,	 ‘institutions	 can	 be	
accounted	 for	 by	 examining	 the	 incentives	 facing	 the	 actors	 who	 created	 and	
maintain	 them.	 Institutions	 exist	 because	 they	 could	 have	 reasonably	 been	




The	 lead	 up	 to	 UNGASS	 2016	 was	 dominated	 by	 a	 reformist	 discourse	
highlighting	 the	 failures	 of	 the	 ‘war	 on	 drugs’.	 	 However,	 UNGASS	 ultimately	
failed	 to	 live	up	 to	 the	hopeful	predictions	of	many	reformers.	Some	reformers	
tried	 to	 leverage	 areas	 of	 divergence	 (legal	 or	 political)	 as	 a	 wedge	 to	 force	
member	 states	 to	 reopen	 the	 international	 treaty	 system.	 In	 so	 doing	 they	
ignored	that	the	system	is	both	sustained	by,	and	reflects,	overlapping	national	
and	 international	 interests,	 and	 cannot	 be	 perceived	 merely	 as	 an	 exogenous	
determinant	 of	 them.	 The	 ‘regime’,	many	 incorrectly	 argued,	was	 the	 cause	 of	
bad	national	policies.	Changing	the	‘regime’	was	therefore	a	precursor	to	moving	
beyond	 the	 ‘war	 on	 drugs’.	 This	 flawed	 policy	 causality	 drove	 a	 rejection	 of	




rapidity	of	normative	 and	political	 change.	The	 system	had	previously	 avoided	
the	intrusion	of	cross-thematic	issues	such	as	human	rights	and	public	health.	As	
the	 prominence	 of	 these	 themes	 grow,	 and	 are	 overtly	 recognised	 by	 the	
outcome	 document	 (4),	 the	 singular	 focus	 on	 prohibitionist	 market	 reduction	
that	characterised	the	‘war	on	drugs’	era	will	further	its	long	slow	fade	into	the	
background.	A	notable	and	vocal	anti-reform	bloc	of	member	states	can	continue	
to	 punch	 above	 its	 diplomatic	 weight	 due	 to	 consensus-based	 rules	 which	




advocating	 new	 models	 grounded	 in	 public	 health	 and	 human	 rights	 are	
increasingly	 faced	with	 issues	of	 implementation.	Effectively,	now	 that	 the	war	
on	 drugs	 is	 ending,	 ‘what	 comes	 next?’	 To	 answer	 that	 question	 requires	 a	
flexible	overarching	policy	which	encourages	 local	experimentation	 to	build	an	
evidence	 base	 which	 can	 feed	 back	 up	 to	 international	 dissemination	 forums.	
Underpinning	 this	 policy	 ‘flexibility’	must	 be	 strict	 adherence	 to	human	 rights,	
best	 practice	 public	 health	 and	market	 impact	 reduction	 policies.	 This	 chapter	





United	Nations	 (UN)	 generated	which	 seeks	 to	 justify	 the	 system	 and	derive	 a	
clear	 linear	 trajectory	 from	 problem	 towards	 a	 rational	 and	 ever	 improving	
member	 state	 cooperation.	 Such	 cooperation	 is	 inevitably	 portrayed	 as	 ‘a	
positive	 balance	 sheet’.(5)	 A	 second	 diametrically	 opposed	 stream	 paints	 the	
system	 as	 sheer	 international	 irrationality,	 driven	 by	 racism,	 moralism	 and	







origins	 of	 current	 policy	 and	 read	 current	 debates	 backwards	 into	 discussions	
and	decisions	of	the	past.	The	result	is	that	the	regulatory	underpinnings	(i.e.	‘the	
core’)	 of	 the	 international	 control	 system,	 are	 virtually	 ignored,	 while	
discussions	 fixate	 on	 the	 ‘prohibitionist’	 aspects	 and	 their	 extreme	




The	 international	 control	 system	must	 be	 understood	 first	 and	 foremost	 as	 a	
system	 of	 international	 regulation	 which	 determines	 in	 a	 very	 broad	 manner	
how	 substances	 are	 produced,	 traded	 and	 consumed	 internationally.	 Like	 all	
regulatory	 systems	 it	 has	 prohibited	 aspects,	 or	 at	 least	 attempts	 to	 define	
practices	which	should	be	prevented.	The	regulatory	core	has	been	the	constant	
of	international	control	since	its	inception	in	1912	and	institutionalisation	in	the	
1925,	 1931	 and	 subsequent	 conventions	 and	 protocols.	 The	 prohibitionist	
aspects	 represented	 a	 shifting	 parameter	 determined	 by	 national	 politics,	





outlined	 in	 the	so-called	 ‘Brownfield	Doctrine’,	named	after	Assistant	Secretary	
of	State	for	the	Bureau	of	International	Narcotics	and	Law	Enforcement	Affairs,	is	
to	 defend	 the	 ‘core’	 of	 the	 drug	 conventions	 while	 allowing	 flexible	









International	 control	 efforts	began	 in	earnest	 around	 the	 turn	of	 the	 twentieth	
century.	 The	 opium	 trade	of	 the	nineteenth	 century	developed	 a	 reputation	 as	
exploitative	 and	 immoral,	 drawing	 fire	 from	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 but	




Opposing	 these	drives	were	national	 and	 colonial	 interests,	 including	 concerns	
regarding	 the	growth	of	 illicit	markets	and	 the	 lack	of	 regulatory	 structures	or	
capacity	 in	 areas	 of	 weak	 governance;	 genuine	 concern	 for	 the	 wellbeing	 of	
‘addicted’	 populations;	 and	 economic	 interest,	 extending	 (decreasingly)	 to	
colonial	 revenue	 and	 (increasingly)	 to	 concerns	 for	 shares	 	 of	 the	 global	 drug	
manufacturing	market.		
	
From	 these	 competing	 concerns	 and	 interests	 emerged	 the	 key	 strands	 of	
international	 drug	 control:	 regulation	 and	 prohibition.	 The	 regulatory	 strand	
focused	 on	 an	 international	 ‘management’	 approach	 to	 the	 drug	 issue.	 It	
recognised	that	although	drugs	could	not	be	eradicated,	their	spill	overs	could	be	
mitigated	 through	 regulatory	 strengthening	 and	 international	 dialogue	 and	
cooperation.	 The	 prohibitionist	 strand	 focused	 on	 moralistic	 or	 progressivist	
views	 that	 sought	 to	 cleanse	 society	 of	 drug	 production	 and	 use,	 including	
(eventually)	all	opium	consumption.	This	understood	the	causality	of	social	harm	
as	 beginning	 with	 drugs.	 Prohibiting	 ever	 more	 types	 of	 production	 and	
consumption	 was	 therefore	 viewed	 as	 the	 key	 to	 reducing	 their	 impact	 on	
society.	
	
	Both	 strands	 converged	 initially	 on	 the	 goal	 of	 lessening	 cross-border	 spill	
overs.	In	1912	this	meant	ending	the	supply	of	drug	commodities	to	areas	which	
had	 legally	 ceased	 their	 demand.	 Over	 time	 this	 evolved	 into	 the	 impulse	 to	
create	an	‘ethical’	licit	market,	thereby	shrinking	available	supplies	for	the	illicit	
market	and	channelling	supplies	to	‘legitimate	medical	and	scientific’	use.(11)	As	




Divergent	 member	 state	 interests	 posed	 an	 insurmountable	 obstacle	 to	 the	
codification	 of	 production	 limitation	 efforts.	 However,	 a	 closely	 monitored	
international	market	in	‘licit’	substances	emerged.	Many	believed	this	would	dry	
up	 the	 available	 supplies	 for	 the	 illicit	 market,	 leaving	 a	 minimal	 role	 for	
enforcement.	 This	 belief	 proved	 misguided.	 An	 illicit	 market	 accompanied	
growing	 international	 demand	 for	 various	 forms	 of	 consumption	 through	 the	
1960s	and	beyond.	Meanwhile,	hubs	of	global	insecurity	emerged	as	key	supply	
hubs,	 feeding	 emerging	markets	 and	 ensuring	 the	 maturation	 of	 consumption	
patterns	in	many	consumer	countries.	
	
The	 response	 was	 a	 renewed	 international	 push	 towards	 shrinking	 and	
repressing	the	illicit	market,	or	at	least	creating	a	perception	of	doing	so.	This	led	
to	the	unilateral	US	declaration	of	the	‘war	on	drugs’	in	the	1970s.	Thereafter	the	
international	 	 regime	 was	 shaped	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 shrink	 production	 and	
consumption,	largely	through	repressive	policing	and	enforcement	measures	the	




on	 drugs’,	 but	 hardly	 the	 only	 one.	While	 a	 plurality	 of	 domestic	 responses	 to	
consumption	 emerged,	 producer	 and	 transit	 countries	 adopted	 uniform	 police	
responses,	and	implemented	frameworks	driven	by	consumer	country	agendas.	
It	was	only	 in	 the	 late	2000s	 that	 a	number	of	producer	 and	 transit	 countries,	
particularly	 in	 Latin	 America,	 began	 to	 challenge	 the	 policy	 prescriptions.	
Meanwhile,	 consumer	 countries,	 witnessing	 maturation	 and	 decline	 of	 certain	
drug	 markets	 –	 opiates	 (Europe)	 and	 cocaine	 (the	 US)	 –	 have	 shifted	 further	




2008	 can	be	 seen	as	 a	 global	 inflection	point.	US	domestic	politics	drove	away	
from	the	‘war	on	drugs,’	while	cascading	state	fiscal	crises	challenged	the	prison	
epidemic.	 Political	 leaders,	 no	 longer	 fearing	 the	 ‘soft	 on	 crime’	 label,	
increasingly	 classed	 the	 ‘war	 on	 drugs’	 as	 ineffective	 and	 racist.	 Reform	
advocates	 spoke,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	of	having	 ‘the	wind	at	 [their]	backs’.	At	 the	
international	level	US	leadership	seemed	uncertain	as	the	Obama	administration,	
who	had	previously	described	the	 ‘war	on	drugs’	as	 ‘an	utter	 failure’,	sought	to	




Latin	 American	 Commission	 report	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Democracy	 criticising	 the	
failures	 of	 past	 policies.	 In	 2011	 the	 first	 report	 of	 the	 Global	 Commission	 on	
Drug	Policy	called	for	‘not	just	alternatives	to	incarceration	and	greater	emphasis	




Meanwhile,	 Mexico	 was	 descending	 into	 violence	 as	 a	 result	 of	 President	
Calderón’s	escalation	of	the	drug	war.	Colombia	was	ascending	from	the	violence	
of	its	darker	days	and	willing,	particularly	under	President	Juan	Manuel	Santos,	
to	 challenge	 the	 key	 assumptions	 underpinning	 the	 supply-centric	 approach	 –	
likening	 it	 to	cycling	a	 stationary	bike.	As	 the	cocaine	commodity	chain	shifted	
further	 into	Central	America,	states	 there,	most	notably	Guatemala,	called	 for	a	
strategic	 re-evaluation.	This	disquiet	 soon	emerged	within	 regional	 forums.	US	
Vice-President	Joseph	Biden	broke	with	policy	orthodoxy	and	referred	to	it	as	a	
‘totally	 legitimate	 debate’,	 although	 initially	 stressing	 no	 change	 in	 the	 US	
position.(13)	 Biden’s	 response	 and	 President	 Obama’s	 subsequence	 support	
helped	pave	the	way	for	an	official	regional	dialogue.		
	
Although	 soft	 on	 tangible	 suggestions,	 the	 2013	 report	 by	 Organization	 of	
American	 States	 (OAS),	 Scenarios	 for	 the	 Drug	 Problem	 in	 the	 Americas,	 2013-
2025,represented	the	first	open	discussion	of	the	problems	with	current	policies	
and	potential	alternatives.		Uruguay	contributed	to	this	debate	by	announcing	its	
intention	 to	 legalise	 cannabis	 as	 a	 crime	 reduction	 measure.	 The	 2012	
legalisation	 of	 cannabis	 in	 Colorado	 and	Washington	 State	 caught	 US	 national	
elites	 off	 guard.	 The	 US	 federal	 government	 faced	 a	 choice	 of	 allowing	 state	
experiments	or	expending	federal	resources	to	enforce	unpopular	federal	laws	in	
sovereign	states	that	had	legalised	substances	in	contravention	to	the	Controlled	
Substances	 Act	 –	 also	 raising	 questions	 about	 US	 compliance	 with	 the	 drug	
control	treaties.	
	
What	 followed	 shocked	 observers.	 In	 March	 2014	 Ambassador	 William	
Brownfield	announced	a	new	US	diplomatic	 approach	 to	drug	policy,	based	on	
increased	 respect	 for	 national	 and	 local	 autonomy.	 Status	 quo	 advocates	were	
blindsided	by	the	lead	nation	publicly	stepping	back	from	enforcing	the	‘war	on	
drugs’	 model.	 Reformist	 actors	 were	 initially	 cautiously	 welcoming.	 Some	
however	 rejected	 the	 framework,	 claiming	 it	 would	 undermine	 the	 case	 for	
treaty	reform,	paper	over	 ‘tensions’	 in	 the	 international	system	and	undermine	
respect	for	international	law.(14)		
	
Others,	myself	 included,	argued	strongly	 in	 favour	of	 this	 ‘Brownfield	Doctrine’	
as	 ‘a	 rational	 approach	 to	 a	 difficult	 question’.(15)	 To	 those	 favouring	
‘flexibilities’	as	an	interim	solution	while	an	evidence	base	emerged,	the	US	was	
showing	 leadership	 by	 providing	 an	 international	 strategic	 framework	 beyond	
marijuana	legalisation.	This	framework	accepted	that	 ‘some	countries	will	have	













that	 it	 would	 obviate	 the	 need	 for	 member	 states	 to	 reopen	 the	 conventions.	
This,	 however,	 was	 never	 a	 realistic	 political	 option.	 Even	 vanguard	 member	
states	 rejected	 treaty	 revisionism,	privately	highlighting	 that	 ‘we	examined	 the	
treaties	 and	 concluded	 that	 nothing	 in	 them	 requires	 a	 ‘war	 on	 drugs’’.3	
Reformists	 rejected	 a	 de	 facto	 victory	 which	 enabled	 broad	 national	 level	
reforms	in	the	hope	of	initiating	a	long-term	process	of	legal	codification	of	these	
same	 goals.	 Political	 bets	 were	 placed	 on	 a	 chaotic	 UNGASS	 producing	
																																																								
3	Private	Discussions.	
spontaneously	 positive	 outcomes	 based	 on	 the	 inescapable	 logic	 of	 reform	
necessity.	
	
In	 the	meantime	 the	 initiative	was	 lost.	Status	quo	actors	 regained	control	and	
reformist	lobbying	never	reached	the	scale	needed	to	become	effective.		Instead	
reformist	civil	society	fixated	on	an	‘expert	commission’,	hoping	to	highlight	the	








Russia	 viscerally	 defended	 the	 status	 quo,	 while	 Europe	 sought	 to	 keep	 drug	
policy	off	its	packed	political	agenda.	The	US,	having	stepped	ahead	of	the	curve	
and	 been	 burned	 by	 both	 status-quo	 and	 reformist	 interests	 stepped	 back	
partially,	asserting	drugs	as	a	sovereign	issue	in	moments	of	bluntness.(17)		
	
The	 US	 solidified	 a	 national	 discourse	 focussed	 on	 treatment	 and	 ‘recovery’,	
transmitting	that	narrative	internationally.	Marijuana	legalisation	had	become	a	
sovereign	 issue	 and	 generally	 remained	 far	 from	 official	 UN	 discourse.	 A	 new	
consensus	 around	 public	 health,	 access	 to	medicines	 and	 the	 need	 for	 human	




As	 the	 ‘outcome	 document’	 materialised	 and	 the	 likely	 contours	 of	 UNGASS	
became	clear,	some	sought	to	unilaterally	veto	the	process,	but	the	dye	was	cast.	
Member	 states	 had	 expended	 significant	 diplomatic	 resources.	 Those	 at	 the	
vanguard	 initially	 sought	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	 the	 outcome,	 but	 soon	
began	to	highlight	the	document	as	a	major	step	forward,	enabling	an	expansion	





Questions	of	where	 to	draw	 the	 line	between	 licit	 and	 illicit	 remain	one	of	 the	
unresolved	tensions	within	the	system	since	its	genesis,	one	resolved	by	political	
consensus	 rather	 than	 legal	 codification.	 As	 Francisco	 Thoumi	 writes,	 ‘despite	




conventions	 generally	 define	 their	most	 important	 terms	 carefully	 and	 in	
this	respect	the	drug	conventions	are	flawed	because	they	fail	to	define	their	









This	 framework	derives	 from	legal	complications	surrounding	 the	enforcement	
of	the	treaties	within	a	federal	political	system.	The	US	remains	the	test	case.	The	
federal	government,	not	individual	states,	is	the	signatory	to	the	UN	drug	control	









RAND	 highlights	 the	 ‘legal	 uncertainties’	 created	 by	 federal	 Supreme	 Court	

















As	 functionalist	 international	 relations	 theory	 would	 predict,	 the	 current	
international	 system	 constitutes	 a	 mechanism	 of	 cost	 displacement,	 interstate	
bargaining	 facilitation	 and	 cross	 border	 contract	 enforcement.	 In	 the	 past	 it	
drove	member	states	towards	a	singular	and	prohibitionist	implementation.	This	




As	 Jonathan	 Caulkins	 writes,	 ‘[p]rohibition	 is	 extraordinarily	 expensive	 on	
multiple	 dimensions,	 including	 budgetary	 costs,	 enrichment	 of	 criminal	 gangs	
and	 deprivation	 of	 liberty.’	 While	 Caulkins	 recognises	 possible	 benefits	 from	
prohibition	spending	 in	consumer	states	up	 to	a	certain	 level	 ($112	billion	per	
year	 in	 the	 US),	 ,	 he	 acknowledges	 these	 potential	 benefits	 do	 not	 apply	 to	
producer	or	transit	countries.(23)		
	
Those	 advocating	 prohibition’s	 continuation	 judge	 the	 benefits	 of	 (probable)	
decreased	 consumption	 to	 outweigh	 the	 costs,	 especially	 if	 it	 can	 be	
implemented	in	a	more	‘rational’	manner.	As	Jonathan	Caulkins	writes:	‘The	goal	
of	prohibition	 is	not	and	should	not	be	to	eradicate	the	corresponding	markets	
completely;	 that	 is	not	realistic.	Rather,	 the	goal	should	be	 to	drive	 the	activity	
underground,	 making	 it	 less	 efficient	 or,	 equivalently,	 driving	 up	 the	 cost	 of	
providing	 the	 good	 or	 service.’(23)	 The	 result	 is	 a	 more	 minimalist	 form	 of	
prohibition.	Caulkins	and	Reuter	suggested	in	2006	that	‘the	United	States	could	




In	 more	 recent	 work,	 Peter	 Reuter	 and	 Harold	 Pollack	 have	 highlighted	 an	
absence	 of	 evidence	 that	 additional	 spending	 on	 prohibition	 above	 a	 certain	
point	 increases	 drug	 prices	 at	 the	 margins.	 Additional	 marginal	 spending	 on	
prohibition’s	 enforcement	 therefore	 has	 no	 impact	 on	 drug	 consumption.(25)	
This	 complements	 a	 vibrant	 public	 health	 literature	 which,	 as	 Natasha	
Horsfield’s	 contribution	 highlights,	 demonstrates	 the	 concrete	 negative	 impact	






‘Focused-deterrence	 strategies,	 selective	 targeting	 and	 sequential	 interdiction	
efforts	 [which]	 are	 often	 more	 promising	 law	 enforcement	 alternatives	 than	
flow-suppression	 or	 zerotolerance	 approaches’.(27)	 As	 Mark	 Shaw	 wrote	 in	
2016:	
	
Evidence	 and	 experience	 has	 shown	 that	 a	 broader	 set	 of	 harms	 that	 are	
resulting	 from	the	growth	of	criminal	networks,	 including	prolific	violence	
in	 certain	 states,	 are	 only	 exacerbated	 by	 hard	 line	 criminal	 justice	 and	
militarised	approaches.	 If	the	full	harms	of	drug	trafficking	and	use	are	to	




in	 order	 to	 empirically	 determine	 the	 benefits	 of	 prohibition	 relative	 to	
alternatives.	 Further,	 they	 highlight	 that	 to	 shift	 policies	 at	 a	 global	 scale	 will	
require	member	states	to	shift	policies	on	a	local	scale,	which	will	require	large	
investments	 of	 political	 capital	 and	 research	 and	 innovation.(10)	 As	 Mark	
Kleiman	and	Jeremy	Ziskind	wrote	in	2014:		
	
‘The	places	 that	 legalise	cannabis	 first	will	provide	–	at	 some	risk	 to	 their	
own	populations	–	an	external	benefit	to	the	rest	of	the	world	in	the	form	of	
knowledge,	 however	 the	 experiments	 turn	 out…as	 the	 pioneering	
jurisdictions	take	adequate	measures	to	prevent	‘exports’’.(29)	
	
Member	states	s	risk	 that	deregulation	 in	one	state	will	 increase	 illicit	 flows	 to	
their	state.	The	great	scientific	experiment	underway	is	whether	that	is	the	case.	
If	 not,	 then	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 system	 –	 to	 prevent	 unregulated	 cross	 border	
flows,	 remains	 intact,	 albeit	 through	 a	 different	 conception	 of	 national	
regulations.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 cannabis	 it	 is	 demonstrably	 clear	 that	 marginal	
increases	in	prohibition	will	not	bring	about	further	reductions	in	consumption.	
Consequently	regulation	in	the	absence	of	alternatives	(as	European	powers	did	










‘war	 on	 drugs’	 as	 ‘all	 wrong’	 and	 is	 at	 pains	 to	 highlight	 tactical	 changes	
producing	a	broader	strategic	shift	away	from	the	 ‘war’	strategy.(30)	This	does	
not	 negate	 the	 need	 for	 broad	 tactical	 disagreements	 and	 highlighting	
hypocrisies,	 such	 as	 the	 US	 ceasing	 the	 war	 on	 drugs	 at	 home	 while	 pushing	
many	 of	 the	 same	 interventions	 overseas.	 Similarly	 voices,	 including	 the	
President	of	the	United	States,	are	right	to	highlight	that	their	 ‘war	on	drugs’	 is	
being	 ended	as	perceptions	of	 the	median	 ‘user’	 have	 shifted	 away	 from	being	
black	and	poor	to	being	white	and	middle	class.(31)	
	





or	 is	 expanding.	 In	 these	 cases,	 human	 rights	 groups	will	 find	 the	most	 likely	
bulwark	within	the	existing	corpus	of	international	human	rights	law.		Any	new	
obligations	 towards	 treating	 drug	 dependence	 would	 require	 universal	






the	 legal	 regulation	 of	 its	 derivative	 cocaine.	 In	 this	 context,	 providing	 that	
countries	experimenting	with	regulation	 take	measures	 to	prevent	exports,	 the	
impact	on	surrounding	jurisdictions	will	likely	be	mixed.	It	is	clear	that	in	a	free	
movement	 system	 such	 as	 the	 US,	 unilateral	 legalisation	 of	 cannabis	 by	 single	
states	 will	 impact	 neighbouring	 ones	 through	 increased	 availability.	 However,	
one	 could	 as	 easily	 expect	 a	 simultaneous	 decrease	 in	 criminality.	 At	 the	
international	 level	 the	 impacts	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 diminished	 through	 existing	
trading	and	border	restrictions.		
	
The	 trade	 in	 certain	 drugs	 (particularly	 the	 high	 quality/value/price	 market	
segment)	will	 likely	gravitate	to	 jurisdictions	which	have	 legalised,	 for	example	
Mexican	 cannabis	 cultivation	 collapsed	 post-US	 state	 legalisations.	 This	 will	
likely	undermine	 the	 illicit	 industry.	Actors	 in	 these	 areas	may	 shift	 into	other	
illicit	activities	for	example	opium	cultivation,	extortion	and	other	types	of	crime.	
Nevertheless,	this	will	diminish	the	availability	of	illicit	opportunities	and	profit	
making	 potential.	 In	 areas	 which	 have	 specialised	 in	 certain	 illicit	 drug	
production,	 for	example	 rural	Afghanistan	or	Colombia,	 the	 shift	 to	a	 legalised,	
concentrated	 and	 potentially	 mechanised	 market	 would	 likely	 wipe	 out	 their	




trade	 in	 the	 Americas	 now	 seems	 possible.	 As	 this	 chapter	 highlights,	 current	
evidence	 suggests	 a	 low	 risk	 of	 decriminalisation	 of	 use	 causing	 increased	
consumption.	Further,	supply-side	enforcement	efforts	are	likely	drastically	over	
prioritised	 relative	 to	 their	 marginal	 impact	 on	 prices,	 particularly	 in	 mature	
markets.	A	trend	towards	reducing	enforcement	intensity	seems	unlikely	to	fuel	
increased	criminality	or	the	supply	of	illicit	drugs.	While	decriminalisation	does	




The	 focus	 should	be	on	determining	where	 criminalisation	 is	 required	 to	 keep	




be	 a	 move	 towards	 a	 demilitarised	 approach,thereby	 minimising	 the	 criminal	
and	broader	impacts	of	drug	markets.		
	




the	 bottom’,	 the	 current	 scope	 and	 scale	 of	 regulatory	 experimentation	 is	
insufficient	 to	 justify	 this	as	a	mitigating	concern.	 Jonathan	Caulkins	coined	the	
predicted	immediate	impact	on	global	markets	of	one	country’s	legalisation	of	a	
commercial	cocaine	or	heroin	industry,	as	the	‘grand	fracture’.i	The	onset	of	such	
a	 ‘grand	 fracture’	 would	 raise	 such	 concerns	 but	 is	 unforeseeable	 at	 present.	
Local	jurisdictions	will	have	to	balance	the	desirability	of	unilaterally	decreased	
penalties	 or	 increased	 regulation,	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 prevalence	 of	 those	
activities	 increasing	 and	 centralising	 in	 their	 jurisdictions.	 For	 example,	 while	
unilateral	non-enforcement	of	cocaine	transit	prohibitions	in	a	Central	American	
nation	 such	 as	 Guatemala	will	 likely	 have	minimal	 impacts	 on	 retail	 prices	 or	
consumption	patterns	in	New	York	City,	it	will	have	significant	political	economy	
impacts	within	Guatemala	which	need	 to	be	 taken	 into	account.	The	 lessons	of	
attempted	legalisation	of	the	cannabis	trade	will	provide	important	data	sets	for	
beginning	 to	 evaluate	 these	 policy	 options,	 hence	 the	 value	 of	 an	 era	 of	 small	
scale,	incremental	regulatory	experimentation.	
	
The	 immediate	 years	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 UNGASS	 2016	 should	 be	
characterised	 by	 a	 drive	 to	 innovation.	 Successes	 will	 likely	 drive	
implementation.	 What	 seems	 likely	 is	 that	 international	 drug	 policy	 in	 the	
coming	years	will	be	determined	by	local,	national	and	regional	actions,	and	the	
UN	 will	 carve	 out	 a	 new	 role	 in	 pursuing	 a	 global	 public	 good	 through	 drug	
policy.	 In	 the	past	 this	public	 good	was	viewed	 in	 terms	of	 a	 singular	 focus	on	
prohibition.	Now	political	and	funding	constraints	will	force	the	drug	policy	arms	
of	the	UN	to	assume	a	reactive	role,	avoiding	political	dispute	and	chasing	areas	
of	 consensus,	 evidence	 and	 funding.	 Meanwhile,	 other,	 previously	 silent,	 UN	
bodies	 will	 likely	 encroach	 on	 traditional	 UN	 Commission	 on	 Narcotic	 Drugs	




Similarly,	 reformist	 civil	 society	 will	 contend	 not	 with	 an	 intransigent	 and	
singular	global	‘regime’,	but	the	political	calculations	of	local	actors.	The	outcome	
of	the	UNGASS	2016	process	has	been	a	repatriation	of	some	policy	sovereignty	
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